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Abstract  
This paper analyzes music charts of an online music distributor. In music charts, the digital music 
provider displays a daily ranking of 1st ~ 100th and a weekly ranking of 1st ~ 1,000th songs on its 
website. And the ranking of each song is assigned based on streaming volumes and download volumes. 
This paper studies how the online music distributor should set its ranking policy to maximize the 
value of online music ranking service. Compared to the current ranking mechanism which is being 
used by music sites and only considers streaming and download volumes, a new ranking mechanism 
is proposed in this paper. A key improvement of the new ranking mechanism is to reflect a more 
accurate preference pertinent to popularity, pricing policy and slot effect based on exponential decay 
model for online users. A ranking model is built to verify correlations between two service volumes 
and popularity, pricing policy, and slot effect. An empirical analysis is followed to illustrate some of 
the general features of online music charts and to validate the assumptions used in the new ranking 
model. The results from the empirical work show that the new ranking mechanism proposed will be 
more effective than the former one in several aspects. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
In days of Internet commerce, sales of recorded music in compact disk (CD) format have declined 
steadily because consumers increasingly have moved toward digital real time streaming and 
downloading. The majority of music is now sold in digital format, and real time played or 
downloaded to online users’ audio devices such as smart phone, portable music players, or other 
machines. Online music providers employ a variety of business models for the distribution of digital 
music. Music single item downloading service and subscription services are more and more common 
as the digital contents are delivered more and more by online channels. 
The characteristics of competition among digital contents distributors, specifically online music 
distributors, closely resemble those of monopolistic competition. The Internet information reduces 
search costs relative to visiting physical stores (Chevalier and Austan 2003). The accurate ranking 
service of music charts reduces search costs relative to visiting physical stores or competitors’ 
websites. Online music distributors give some portion of the revenue as commission to music source 
providers. And they have ranking mechanisms to list the digital contents on ranking slots. The digital 
contents ranking is generally decided based on possible parameters including download volumes and 
streaming volumes. A key issue for the online music distributor is how its ranking policy should be 
determined to maximize the value of the ranking service and to maximize its revenue by extension 
(Chen 2009). The ranking policy in this paper will be regenerated through the new ranking 
mechanism, which reflects a more accurate preference pertinent to popularity, pricing policy and slot 
effect based on exponential decay model (Breese et al 1998) for online users. In a related mechanism 
used in online sponsored search advertising, search engine rank by expected revenue (Edelman et al 
2007).  
This paper represents an effort to apply a new ranking mechanism to reflect online users’ preference 
and slot effect more accurately compared to existing ranking service of music charts offered by the 
online music provider. For this purpose, we use an analytical method that track how online users 
respond the offered ranking service with the proposed parameters like popularity and slot effect, and 
empirical works including a set of generally available statistics. The suggestions from our analysis on 
popularity and slot effect will have important economic and ranking policy implications, specifically 
as digital contents managers try to evaluate the value proposition of the ranking service and to 
maximize the revenue.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review on the application of ranking 
information service and ranking mechanisms for other digital contents. Section 3 presents a ranking 
model of the online music distributor and considers how the provider might design its ranking 
algorithm to maximize the ranking service and its own revenue by extension. Sections 4 presents 
empirical work including data description collected from the online music provider, the illustration of 
the general features of online music charts, and the validation for the assumptions used in the new 
ranking mechanism model. The last section presents concluding remarks with some broader 
implications and future works.   
2 LITERATURE REVIEWS 
Mechanism design was originated from the possibility of efficient resource allocation in socialist 
society in the 1930s. And Leonid Hurwicz (1960) developed the mechanism design theory. He 
defined mechanism as a communication system amongst principal and agents, and where a pre-
specified rule assigns an allocation of goods and services. The incentive-compatibility allowing the 
incentive of self-interested participants is the key notion for mechanism design theory (Leonid 
Hurwicz 1972). An online user visiting one of online contents sale websites and looking for digital 
contents would typically face a screen the price of the contents, the relative sales ranking at the sites, 
etc (Chevalier and Austan 2003). Online users (agents) spontaneously access to music chart 
information by ranking mechanism without costs, and they receive a pay-off of reducing search costs. 
That is, an allocation through ranking mechanism is realized by voluntary participation of online users. 
And the advanced ranking mechanism by designer (principal) can realize more sophisticated 
allocation amongst principal and online users. It results in the increase of revenue for principal and the 
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increase of utility for agents.  
In economics perspectives, demand of digital contents is significantly correlated with the relative 
sales ranking and pricing policy. The sales ranking is likely to stimulate the herd instinct of people. 
The bandwagon effect disturbs the theory of supply and demand pertinent to contents pricing and 
individual preference (Leivenstein 1950). But it is an important phenomenon for the increase of a 
demand for digital contents. In terms of ranking effect, Spoerri (2008) investigated whether the rank 
position of a document combined with the information of the number of systems that retrieved it can 
help to produce a better estimate of the document’s probability of being relevant. The result showed 
that a document’s probability of being relevant increases as it is placed higher up in a ranked list, but a 
document’s probability of being relevant decreases exponentially as it is located lower down in a 
ranked list. It implicates a linkage among digital contents placed in a high ranking i.e. popularity. The 
literature reviews of ranking relevant works can be categorized into estimated sale of ranking items 
and ranking mechanisms. 
 
2.1 Estimated Sale of Ranked Items 
Bradford (1934) estimated the exponentially diminishing returns of extending a search for references 
in science journals. But this pattern is called a Pareto distribution in many disciplines. Pareto (1896) 
found that income can be approximated such a log-linear distribution, which is a power law 
probability distribution that coincides with social, scientific, geophysical, actuarial, and many other 
types of observable phenomena. Zipf (1949) suggested that city size follows a log-linear distribution 
with a slope of -1. It is called a Zipf’s law, which is most easily observed by plotting the data on a log-
log graph, with the axes being log (rank order) and log (frequency). Brynjolfsson et al (2003) fit data 
on sales and sales rank to a log-linear (Pareto) distribution. The ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression of log-sales on log-rank was suggested by Madeline Schnapp of O’Reilly Books who 
reported excellent success estimating competitors’ unit book sales by comparing their’ sales ranks to 
O’Reilly’s. Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) also fit sales and sales rank data to a slightly different log-
linear distribution with good success. And Chen (2009) fit downloads and download ranking data for 
iFart application to a regression of log-popularity (downloads) on rank.  
 
2.2 Ranking mechanisms 
In sponsored search, Feng et al (2007) examined that the positive correlation between top placement 
and increased traffic creates significant demand among businesses for top placement on search 
engines, especially for popular and commercially-relevant search terms. And Edelman et al (2007) 
also examined that search engines rank advertisements based on expected revenue, which is the 
product of expected clicks and price. Wu and Huberman (2008) explore three ranking rules for 
dynamic aggregation websites. The three ranking rules are novelty, popularity, and expected clicks 
defined as the product of past popularity and a novelty decay factor. It is a ranking mechanism that 
maximizes clicks over time. And they found that the best click-maximizing ranking rule depends 
crucially on the rate decay of novelty. Chen (2009) modeled a ranking mechanism based on popularity 
and revenue including application price, quality, and ranking. And he arranged the revenue-
maximizing ranking rules: sponsored search is based on revenue, dynamic websites is based on 
popularity and novelty and app stores are based on popularity and revenue.  
In terms of exponential decay model, Breese et al (1998) validated that exponential decay of attention 
is a fairly standard assumptions. Feng et al (2007) computed the expected number of click-through for 
an item at a position. And their simulation employed an exponentially decaying attention model. For 
example, actual click-through data obtained from Overtune during 2003 for the top five positions 
across all affiliates including Yahoo!, MSN, and AltaVista, are fitted extremely well by an exponential 
decay model (Feng et al 2007).  
 
3 RANKING MODEL  
This paper applies and extends existing ranking mechanism to reflect accurately online users’ 
617
 
 
preference with bandwagon effect, ranking effect and slot effect on music charts available through 
online music distribution industries. For this study, total effect affecting a demand of streaming and 
download volumes is defined. Figure 1 show that the exponential decrease of streaming volumes and 
download volumes appears specifically in a ranking-range of 1st ~ 100th. It corresponds to the 
exponential decay of attention assumed by Breese et al (1998). It represents slot effect pertinent to the 
exponential decay of attention and bandwagon effect and ranking effect based on the intensive 
popularity propulsion.  
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Figure 1:  streaming & download volumes by rank-order of 737 music-ids, 15/07/09~13/08/09 
Furthermore, the massive disparity between amounts in two services in the same ranking-range 
indicates that a relative value of each service volume should be estimated differently as the ranking-
range goes up or down further. Online music providers usually employ a business model including a 
single item downloading service ( )up  and a subscription service ( )sp  for the distribution of digital 
music. The pricing policy of ( )up  for single downloading and ( )sp  for limited downloading and 
unlimited streaming is mainly responsible for the massive disparity in a ranking-range of 1st ~ 100th.  
The new model follows ranking rules of online music distributors, expected two service volumes 
responding to popularity with bandwagon effect, ranking effect and pricing policy, and the slot effect. 
The major objective of this study is to find how demand of the two volumes reflects the intensive 
popularity propulsion and the slot effect, and which ranking mechanism caters for more valuable 
information service to customers. It is believed that, resulting from providing more valuable 
information service, the service maximizes the revenue for the online music distributers.    
 
3.1 Ranking application  
Ranking of each song ( )r  has a demand for streaming volumes ( )s  and a demand for downloading 
volumes ( )d . Streaming counts of a song are calculated by the number of streaming play by online 
music listeners while download counts are calculated by the number of download by online music 
down-loaders. A ranking is the pair ( , )s d composed of a song’s demand for volumes being streaming 
played and volumes downloaded. The value of one streaming volume is not usually equal to a value of 
one download volume. The value of a download is regarded as much bigger than that of a streaming 
play in high ranking sections and the value difference decreases as the ranking slot goes down further. 
In terms of maximizing its revenue, a download is more valuable than a streaming play. The more 
download volumes increases, the more its revenue increases. Additionally, low download volumes are 
high in scarcity in comparison with high streaming volumes. Therefore, ranking of each song ( )r  is 
composed of adjusted streaming volumes ( )sα ) and adjusted download volumes ( )dβ . The value 
parameter of a streaming play is ( 1)α ≈ , and the value parameter of a download is ( )s
d
β σ≈ . And 
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the summation of the relative ratios ( , )α β  is ( 1 ; 1)s
d
σ σ≈ + > , and ( )σ  is a weight-coefficient 
for downloads. Online music distributors have a ranking rule, which put mostly more weight-value on 
downloads. And they assign a ranking to each song on ( : )
s d
s d s d
α β
α β α β+ + value basis. Streaming 
volumes of a song are easily affected by popularity ( )θ , resulting in a demand of streaming 
volumes ( )s s θ= . And the demand of streaming volumes is convexly increasing in popularity, i.e. 
( ) 0s θθ
∂ >∂  and
2
2 ( ) 0s θθ
∂ >∂ . Download volumes ( )d d θ=  are also easily affected by popularity. 
And the demand of download volumes is increasing in popularity i.e. ( ) 0d θθ
∂ >∂  and the marginal 
demand is positive i.e. 
2
2 ( ) 0d θθ
∂ >∂  . 
A subscription fee and a single unit price assume to be identical across all songs. In case of streaming, 
each song bears a subscription fee ( )sp , but streaming volumes of a song is not easily affected by the 
fee. Each song is real-time played unlimitedly by a subscription fee for a set period, ( )ss s p=  
resulting in increase of streaming volumes in a subscription fee ( ) 0s
s
s p
p
∂ >∂ . Download volumes of 
a song is not easily affected by a subscription fee ( )sp , but easily affected by a single unit price ( )up . 
Each song can be downloaded up to allocated volumes by a subscription fee, but it tends to be 
downloaded less than the allocated volumes for a set period, ( , )s ud d p p=  and download volumes 
decreases as a single unit price increases, resulting in increase of download volumes in subscription 
fee, ( ) 0s
s
d p
p
∂ >∂ , but decrease in a single unit price ( ) 0uu
d p
p
∂ <∂ .  
Once a subscription fee is paid, it is a sunk cost. Digital music listeners do not concern about 
additional charge for listening music for a set period and log-ins can download their preferences up to 
the allocated volumes during a given period of time. But other people have to consider paying a single 
unit price per a download volume.  
 
3.2 Demand function  
The demand ( , )i i i iD D s d= for a given song ( )i is a function of streaming volumes ( )is  and 
download volumes ( )id . The demand ( )iD  is the expected volumes that song ( )i  would receive if it 
is in ranking places i.e., 1st ~ 5th, 6th ~ 20th, 21st ~ 50th, 51st ~ 100th, etc. This is scaled down by the slot 
effect.  
The demand ( )iD  increase as popularity ( )iθ  increases i.e. ( ( , ), ( , , )) 0i i i s i i s u
i
D s p d p pθ θθ
∂ >∂  
and ( )iD  increases as a subscription fee ( )sp  increases i.e. ( ( , ), ( , , )) 0i i i s i i s u
s
D s p d p p
p
θ θ∂ >∂  
but ( )iD  decreases as a single unit price ( )up  increases i.e. ( ( , ), ( , , )) 0i i i s i i s u
u
D s p d p p
p
θ θ∂ <∂ . 
And there are no substitutive and complementary relations between songs.  
Demand function: ( ( , ), ( , , ))i i i i s i i s uD D s p d p pθ θ=  
 
3.3 Ranking function  
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Digital music distributors assign a ranking to each song on a demand of two different service volumes 
basis. And each service value is weight-adjusted based on the amount of streaming played and 
downloaded. There may be other parameters such as age of online music or artist’s reputation. In 
reality, a demand for low-ranked songs is likely to be affected by the other parameters. But this model 
concentrates on mixture of streaming volumes and downloads volumes as two key factors affecting a 
ranking score. In particular, the online music distributors assign a ranking score to each song, and then 
it is rank-displayed on online music charts every day and every week.  
Ranking function: ( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ), ( , , ))i i i i i i i i i s i i s ur s d D s d D s p d p pα β α θ β θ= =  
Let ( )ir be a song ( )i ’s rank, which is based on its score relative to other scores. The 
parameters ( , )α β  assume to be identical across all songs in a sectionalized ranking slot i.e. 1st ~ 5th, 
6th ~ 20th, 21st ~ 50th, 51st ~ 100th, etc. The parameters allow digital music distributors adjust the total 
scores based on rank scores by streaming volumes and rank scores by download volumes. That is, 
( )α  is a parameter that represents the relative value of streaming volumes compare with the value of 
download volumes. ( )β  is a parameter that represents the relative value of download volumes 
compare with the value of streaming volumes. For a simple example, if a song has 390 streaming 
plays and 30 downloads for a ranking estimation period and ( )α  value is 1 and ( )β  value is 17 
390( 1.3 ; 1.3)
30
σ≈ × = , total scores of the song is (900 1*390 17*30)= + . And the value of 
download volumes (510) is adjusted compare with the value of streaming volumes (390) in this case. 
We will explore the conditions under which online music distributors would prefer certain value of 
( )σ in future work. 
 
3.4 Slot effect 
Most songs receive a ranking and it is displayed on a ranking slot, which is a limited space on screen. 
And ranking of a song can be affected by the slot effect, specifically in high ranking slots. The slot 
effect is the phenomenon in which log-ins are less likely to listen or download an song that is further 
down in the ranking since they need to expend more effort to scroll down to see this song (Chen, 
2009). For an amplification of ranking slots, the online music distributor has a ranking chart of 1st ~ 
5th on main page. And the chart can be expanded to 1st ~ 20th by clicking an expansion icon. Online 
music chart displays every 50 popular songs in a sectionalized web-page. And users capture roughly 
20 songs by one time scrolling down on a wide-screen. Therefore, the slots being applicable to 1st ~ 
50th songs are approximately categorized into 1st ~ 5th, 6th ~ 20th, and 21st ~ 50th. The slot effect is 
largely downsized as ranking categories go down further after 50th.  
In the literature review, the slot effect ( )ρ  has often been modeled using the exponential decay model 
where slot ( )j  has its click through rate decreased by a factor of 1
1( ) jjρ ϕ −=  for 1ϕ > (Feng et al, 
2007). In this paper, the slot effect ( )ρ  multiplicatively scales down the demand ( )D , so that the 
demand for a song ( )i  in slots ( 1jφ = : 1st ~ 5th), ( 2jφ = :6th ~ 20th), ( 3jφ = :21st ~ 50th), ( 4jφ = :51st ~ 100th), 
( jφ =∞ :101th~), etc is ( ( , ), ( , , )) ( )ji i i s i i s u iD s p d p pα θ β θ ρ φ . The new ranking model will be built 
based on following functions (1), (2), and (3). 
(1) Demand function ( ( , ), ( , , ))s s uD D s p d p pθ θ=  
(2) Ranking function ( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ), ( , , ))i i i i i i i i i s i i s ur s d D s d D s p d p pα β α θ β θ= =  
(3) Ranking function (Slot effect) ( , ) ( ( , ), ( , , )) ( )ji i i i i i s i i s u ir s d D s p d p pα θ β θ ρ φ=  
4 EMPIRICAL WORK 
This paper introduces a new ranking model to reflect intensive popularity propulsion associated with 
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the bandwagon effect, which is the phenomenon that people’s preference for a commodity increases 
as the number of people buying it increases (Leivenstein 1950), ranking effect (Spoerri 2008) and slot 
effect. The bandwagon effect seems to be clearly observed at high-ranked slots even though herd 
instinct disturbs the theory of supply and demand based on price and personal preference. Slot effect 
also seems to be eminent in high-ranked slots.  
 
4.1 Data and Hypotheses development 
The raw data for this analysis obtained from one of top online music distributors in Korea. When a 
user opens the online music website, he can view a music chart of 1st ~ 5th in the middle of the web 
site, and then other charts by category e.g., a TOP 100 chart, a TOP 1,000 chart, etc by clicking a 
music chart icon. The ranking chart data were gathered starting from July 15 to August 13, 2009. And 
the gathered data were classified into streaming log files, download history files, and weekly ranking 
charts. Available data including login identification (ID), streaming-length, track-id and track-length 
were minded by using structured query language (SQL) from streaming log files. Data such as login-
id, subscription-base purchasing or a single unit price-base purchasing were extracted from download 
history files. And data like music-id, streaming volumes, and download volumes were gained from 
weekly ranking charts. The streaming log files provide useful information: what song was played, 
how many times it was played, and by whom it was played in a day. The download history files show 
that who downloaded songs by subscription fee or by a single unit price. And a weekly chart shows 
that what ranking a song has and how many streaming and downloads volumes the song received in a 
week. The raw data illustrates the existing ranking mechanism reflecting value measurements for 
streaming and downloading relevant ranking service. In the following section, the general feature of 
online music charts is described. And then, a tight correlation between log (popularity) and ranking, 
and the slot effect proposed is estimated for a new ranking model. There are three relevant hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 1 (The Bandwagon Effect Hypothesis): Ranking is positively correlated with popularity 
propulsion in the highest ranking range.  
 
Hypothesis 2 (The subscription fee Hypothesis): Ranking of streaming plays is positively correlated 
with a subscription fee model in the highest ranking range.  
Hypothesis 3 (The slot effect Hypothesis): High Rankings are positively correlated with slot effect, 
while low ranking is not positively correlated with slot effect. 
 
4.2 Overview of findings about online music charts  
This section presents summary statistics for overall volumes of download, streaming, and mixture by 
online music providers. Figure 2 are graphs of regression lines and scattered plots of the natural 
logarithm of popularity (download volumes, streaming volumes, and adjusted total volumes) against 
rank. 
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Figure 2:  points demonstrating relationship between log (popularity) and rank 
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Rank Download Adjusted Rank Rank Streaming Adjusted Rank Total Rank Adjusted Total
1 35408 1 1 479763 2 1 1062278 
2 30140 3 2 460342 1 2 950782 
5 21046 8 5 357014 5 5 690554 
6 19620 5 6 335015 9 6 621541 
10 15301 6 10 266773 4 10 555243 
11 15161 13 11 266090 18 11 523490 
1017 45 708 1017 1013 805 1017 5011 
1018 38 1016 1018 878 875 1018 5011 
Table 1: download & streaming and ranking for music-id, and a weekly music chart, 
23/07/2009 
(Streaming) ( )AdjustedTotal c Downloadα β ε= + + +  
Variable adjusted total 
C 455.4281
*** 
(36.87642) 
Streaming 0.995890
*** 
(0.001702) 
Download  17.04846
*** 
(0.031360) 
R2 0.999872 
N 1018 (1st~1018th) 
***p<.001, Standard errors are in parentheses 
Table 2:  ordinary least square test results of AdjustedTotal against Streaming and Download  
Table 1, 2 shows that the ranking of a song in a weekly music chart is assigned according to adjusted 
total. The adjusted total is calculated by a weight-adjusted volumes of two service i.e. (Download 
rank: 35408*17: 57%) + (Streaming Rank: 460342*1: 43%) = (Total Rank: 1062278: 100%). As a 
result, the rank of download and streaming is changed into the adjusted rank of download and 
streaming. The data, gathered for 1018 music-ids during the fourth week of July in 2009, provide a 
robust basis for correlating log (popularity) and rank. The variation rate ranges from 10.5 to 3.6 for 
log (download), ranges from 13 to 7 for log (streaming), and ranges from 14 to 8.5 for log (mixed 
volumes). And rank ranges from 1 to 1018. Summary statistics are shown in Table 3.   
 
 Rank log (down-popularity) log (str-popularity) log (total-popularity) 
 Mean  509.5000  5.785148  8.907927  9.547935 
 Median  509.5000  5.497168  8.617762  9.221972 
 Maximum  1018.000  10.47469  13.08105  13.87593 
 Minimum  1.000000  3.637586  6.777647  8.519391 
 Std. Dev.  294.0156  1.097527  1.118532  1.047553 
 Observations  1018  1018 1018  1018 
Table 3: summary statistics for log (popularity) and rank data 
Table 4 indicates regression of log (popularity) on rank. 
1 2log( ) .popularity a a Rank ε= + +  
Variable log(down-popularity) log(str-popularity) log(total-popularity) 
Rank -0.003303
*** 
(5.45E-05) 
-0.003391*** 
(5.41E-05) 
-0.003077*** 
(5.64E-05) 
C 7.468270
*** 
(0.032075) 
10.63541*** 
(0.031839) 
11.11563*** 
(0.033148) 
R2 0.783164 0.794300 0.745801 
N 1018 (1st~1018th) 1018 (1st~1018th) 1018 (1st~1018th) 
***p<.001, Standard errors are in parentheses 
Table 4:  ordinary least square test results of log (popularity) against rank  
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The dependent variables are log (down-popularity), log (str-popularity), and log (total-popularity). 
The coefficient -0.3% on each rank is the percentage change in popularity for a unit increase in 
ranking (i.e. from rank 1 to rank 2). That is, if ranking of one song gets worse by 1, its expected 
popularity will decrease by 0.3%. And every coefficient is significant at the 99.9% level. Ranking is 
an important fact in predicting popularity. The R2 value of log (down-popularity) and log (str-
popularity) shows that rank alone explains around 78% of the variation in the log (popularity). But, 
The R2 value of log (total-popularity) shows that rank alone explains around 74.5%. The power of 
effect size was downsized slightly after the mixture of two services. Figure 2 shows a large variance 
between regression lines and scatted plots in a ranking-range of 1st~100th. It implies there must be a 
factor affecting the large variance. And the large variance implicates bandwagon effect, ranking effect 
and slot effect.  
 
4.3 Analysis of Hypothesis 1 (Bandwagon effect) and Hypothesis 2 (Subscription fee effect)  
Figure 3 are graphs of residual plots of the natural logarithm of popularity (download volumes, 
streaming volumes, and adjusted total volumes) against rank of 1st ~ 20th. 
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Figure 3: residual points between log (popularity) and rank 
 
Variable log(down-popularity) log(str-popularity) log(total-popularity) 
Rank (1st~5th) 
(R2) 
-0.120497*** 
(97%) 
-0.083295** 
(81%) 
-0.116552*** 
(95%) 
Rank (6th~20th) 
(R2) 
-0.048182*** 
(99%) 
-0.019011*** 
(81%) 
-0.033186*** 
(98%) 
Rank (21st~50th) 
(R2) 
-0.030709*** 
(98%) 
-0.015610*** 
(93%) 
-0.020096*** 
(98%) 
Rank (51st~100th) 
(R2) 
-0.019881*** 
(95%) 
-0.019131*** 
(98%) 
-0.017783*** 
(95%) 
Rank (101st~150th) 
(R2) 
-0.013399*** 
(98%) 
-0.010879*** 
(97%) 
-0.008719*** 
(93%) 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1, R-squared are in parentheses 
Table 5:  OLS test results of log (popularity) against rank in sectionalized slots (not adjusted) 
Table 5 illustrates log (popularity) on rank in sectionalized slots. The R2 value of log (str-popularity) 
on rank is 81% in a ranking range of 1st~20th. And the coefficient of rank (1st ~ 5th) is significant at the 
5% level not like log (down-popularity). A subscription fee model implicates a little bit low R2 value 
of log (str-popularity) because the streaming service is used unlimitedly with a subscription fee. On 
the other hand, the R2 value of log (down-popularity) maintains a high value of more than 96%. It 
comes from limited downloading service. This validates hypothesis 2. The coefficient values represent 
the intensive popularity propulsion in high-ranking slots, i.e. the coefficient -12% of log (down-
popularity), which indicates that a demand for download volumes in a ranking range of 1st~5th will 
increase up to 12% as ranking of a song increases by 1. The R2 value of log (str-popularity) and log 
(down-popularity) sustains 95%~99% in most ranking slots except the case. So, hypothesis 1 is 
supported. It is clear that ranking is the most important factor in predicting popularity. At the same 
time, a demand for streaming volumes in a high ranking range is affected by a subscription fee.  
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Variable log(down-popularity) log(str-popularity) log(total-popularity) 
Rank (1st~5th) 
(R2) 
-0.126112** 
(83%) 
-0.109528 
(54%) 
-0.116552*** 
(95%) 
Rank (6th~20th) 
(R2) 
-0.049284*** 
(71%) 
-0.018974** 
(37%) 
-0.033186*** 
(98%) 
Rank (21st~50th) 
(R2) 
-0.029325*** 
(63%) 
-0.015580*** 
(41%) 
-0.020096*** 
(98%) 
Rank (51st~100th) 
(R2) 
-0.016564*** 
(43%) 
-0.017858*** 
(47%) 
-0.017783*** 
(95%) 
Rank (101st~150th) 
(R2) 
-0.008947** 
(10%) 
-0.010118*** 
(17%) 
-0.008719*** 
(93%) 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1, R-squared are in parentheses 
Table 6:  OLS test results of log (popularity) against rank in sectionalized slots (adjusted) 
The R2 value of log (total-popularity) maintains a high average around the 95 percents. It results from 
a ranking policy, which assigns a ranking to each song on an adjusted value basis by artificial means 
without considering popularity propulsion, slot effect, and other factors. Under the existing ranking 
policy, table 6 shows that the R2 value of the adjusted log (str-popularity) shows that rank alone 
explains about 40% ~ 50% of the variation in ranking slots of 1st ~ 100th. The R2 value of the adjusted 
log (down-popularity) shows that rank alone explains 43% ~ 83% percentage of the variation in 
ranking slots of 1st ~ 100th. But the R2 value steeply decreases as rank drops.  
 
4.4 Analysis of Hypothesis 3 (Slot effect) 
It seems reasonable that if users need to scroll down a couple pages to see an application, they will 
have a lower likelihood of purchasing the application (Chen 2009). 
 
Slot ρ =0.4976 Download(average) ρ =0.7 Streaming(average) ρ =0.5887 Total (average) 
Slot 1 (1st~5th) 0 1ρ =  27688.6 0 1ρ =  385437.4 0 1ρ =  856143.6 
Slot 2 (6th~20th) 1ρ =0.497622 13778.467 1ρ =0.700006 269808.5 1ρ =0.588736 504042.5 
Slot 3 (21st~50th) 2ρ =0.222524 6161.3667 2ρ =0.449777 173361 2ρ =0.324834 278104.2 
Slot 4 (51st~100th) 3ρ =0.084778 2347.38 3ρ =0.147551 56871.78 3ρ =0.113698 97341.92 
Slot 5 (101st~150th) 4ρ =0.03759 1040.82 4ρ =0.066678 25700.22 4ρ =0.051393 44000.04 
Table 7:  slot effects in sectionalized slots 
Table 7 approximately shows that the slot effect is around ( 0.7ρ = ) for streaming volumes. This 
means a demand for streaming volumes in slot 1 is roughly 11 ~5( ( , ), ( , , )) ( )s s u st thD D s p d p pθ θ ρ φ=  
i.e. 0*0.7D . Demand in slot 2 is 1*0.7D , and 2*0.7D  in slot 3. The slot effect is around 
( 0.4976ρ = ) for a demand for download volumes. The demand in slot 1 is roughly 0*0.4976D , 
1*0.4976D  in slot 2, and 2*0.4976D in slot 3. The average demand of streaming and download 
volumes decreases exponentially as the ranking slot goes down. Hypothesis 3 is supported. It 
corresponds to the exponential decay of attention assumed by Breese et al (1998). 
 
4.5 Possible applications of new ranking mechanism 
Digital contents sales compares with their sales rank. The top ranking slots are correlated with 
exponential decay of attention. A subscription fee for unlimited usage creates significant issues for 
online business models. The new ranking mechanism we suggest can be applied to other ranking 
services in a variety of online contents categories or in different service environments. Online music 
distributors continue a drift of building one-stop service, in which users can enjoy streaming plays 
with smart-phones, on the wireless Internet. The smart-phone has a small screen displaying the top 10 
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lists. A music-id’s specific rank in the top 10 lists has a large effect on streaming volumes with a 
subscription fee. Determining a ranking of each music-id for a daily chart or weekly chart, the 
streaming volumes calculated from smart-phone base reflects the new ranking mechanism very well. 
This mechanism can be applied to real-time sharp-increase search-words i.e. NAVER, No. 1 portal 
site in Korea, provides a small slot displaying the most popular 10 lists in real time. By searching the 
lists of the slot, the ranking of each list is affected by intensive visibility i.e. bandwagon effect 
because it is very popular, and by slot effect receiving limited concentration. Thus, the slots should be 
regarded as scarce resources that need to be allocated carefully. ‘Auction.co.kr’ (a Korean sales 
website) provides the best 100 items of each content category based on rank scores by sales volumes 
of male and rank scores by sales volumes of female. This website initially shows the five best items 
and less than 10 recommendations in a price section. Thus, the ranking of each item in same price 
section can be assigned by the proposed ranking mechanism reflecting bandwagon effect and slot 
effect in a high ranking range. But the total effect will not be as intensive as the total effect in online 
music.      
 
5 CONCLUSION  
In this study, we have examined the ranking mechanism in online music distribution, and have 
presented a model of a new ranking mechanism where online music distributors set pricing policy i.e., 
a single item downloading service and a subscription fee and effort in response to expected user 
demand of downloading volumes and streaming volumes with intensive popularity propulsion i.e., 
ranking effect and bandwagon effect, and slot effect. The key issue of this study is to design a ranking 
mechanism as a communication system between online music providers and online users. Ranking 
information derived from the new mechanism provides the allocations of the increase of utility for 
users. And it is believed that, resulting from providing more valuable information service, the service 
maximizes the revenue for the online music distributers. 
A ranking model was developed to reflect popularity and total effects occurring in high ranking slots. 
The model has the pair ( , )s d composed of a song’s demand for volumes being streaming played and 
volumes downloaded. The demand of streaming play is convexly increasing in popularity and results 
in the increase of streaming volumes in a subscription fee. The demand of download is also convexly 
increasing in popularity and results in the decrease of streaming volumes in a single unit price. This 
model concentrates on the mixture of streaming volumes and download volumes as two key factors 
affecting a ranking score even though there may be other parameters such as age of online music or 
artist’s reputation. Ranking slots are sectionalized in a reasonable way 
Empirical data from one of top online music distributors in Korea illustrates some of general features 
of online music distribution. Ranking is an important factor in predicting popularity standing for a 
demand of download volumes and streaming volumes. Data presents that popularity decreases by 
0.3% due to ranking drop by one step at 99.9% significant level. And the large variance between 
estimate values of rank and standard error in a ranking range of 1st ~ 100th implicates bandwagon, 
ranking effect and slot effect in rankings. When table 5 and 6 are compared, the existing ranking 
mechanism does not reflect the real value of download popularity and streaming popularity 
independently as each R2 value indicates. Empirical data also validates assumptions proposed in our 
ranking model. The coefficient value of rank in each sectionalized slots was downsized steeply as the 
ranking slots go down further at table 5 and 6. The R2 value, 81%, of steaming popularity in a ranking 
range of 1st ~20th manifests the effect of a subscription fee employing unlimited service at table 5. The 
slot effect based on exponential decay of attention is clearly shown in table 7.  
From our analyses, it is expected that the new ranking model will be more effective than the existing 
mechanism. Therefore, the new ranking mechanism is recommended when online music charts are 
designed. The introduction of the new model would be helpful for improvement of the existing 
ranking mechanism. However, for wider application of this study, applications in a variety of online 
contents categories or in different service environments needs to be tested with the proposed 
mechanism. Thus, this study can be extended by future research. Analytical model for the proposed 
mechanism will be built to verify correlations between two service volumes and popularity, pricing 
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policy, and slot effect. A prefer certain value ( )σ will be explored. While our empirical result shows 
positive bandwagon effect and slot effect in a high ranking slot, it may be possible to apply the new 
ranking model to different service environments including smart-phone based ranking, Internet search 
based ranking, etc. It is also possible to extend our methodology to analyze ranking mechanism on 
other online items available through Internet websites. For example, the proposed ranking model can 
be applied to the online sales of movie, electronic-books, software such as game applications, living 
goods available on online auction sites.  
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